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Article 2

The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering
Doctrine in Times of Terror*
Ann Althouset
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the Rehnquist Court has acquired a
reputation for enforcing federalism,' in reality its efforts have
not been very robust. So far, the Court has crafted its doctrine
to show some deference to state and local government, but it
has not threatened federal power where it is seriously needed.
To a great extent, the Court's federalism decisions have served
the interests of federal power, in that the cutbacks of recent
years have removed unnecessary cases from the federal courts
and placed off limits some areas in which Congress might
otherwise posture for political effect. This constraint on federal
power actually increases the likelihood that Congress will
attend to matters that genuinely require national coordination.2
© 2004 Ann Althouse. All Rights Reserved.
Robert W. & Irma M. Arthur-Bascom Professor, University of Wisconsin
Law School. This Article is part of the David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium, Our
New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror. I
would like to thank Brooklyn Law School and all of the participants in the Trager
Symposium, especially Susan Herman and Ernie Young, and, for editing assistance,
John Althouse Cohen.
To rely on the New York Times, one could easily get the impression that
the Court has gone on a mindless rampage, enforcing federalism without regard for
national interests, leaving Congress powerless to protect us from evils of all kinds. See,
e.g., Linda Greenhouse, For a Supreme Court Graybeard,States' Rights Can Do No

Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, § 4, at 5 (referring to "a stunning series of
federalism decisions that have curbed the power of Congress to bind the states to the
full reach of federal law," and that represent a "federalism revolution," "ignited" by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and "likely to define his place in Supreme Court history").
Thus, it resisted the federalization of crimes and torts traditionally
handled at the state level by placing a limit of the exercise of the commerce power.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding insufficient power to create a
tort cause of action for gender-motivated acts of violence); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (finding insufficient power to make gun possession in a school zone a
crime). For a more extended discussion of the opinion, expressed in the text, that the
Court's federalism has been moderate, see Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases:
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Surely, the war on terrorism demands federal attention: Local
efforts tailored to local preferences are obviously not enough to
deal with an international network of terrorists that threatens
national security.3 Yet, in carrying out the massive federal
effort needed to deal with terrorism after September 11, 2001,
the national government inevitably looks to the vast number of
police, health workers, and other personnel employed at the
state and local government levels.' Local officials are likely to
contribute willingly to many of these efforts, especially in times
of the greatest emergency or when federal money accompanies
federal mandates. Nevertheless, at least some of the time, some
local authorities will find reason to oppose the federal agenda.
Will the federalism doctrine developed by the Supreme
Court in its pre-9/11 days protect the autonomy of state and
local government officials who decide to resist the demands of
federal authorities for assistance in the fight against terrorism?
This Article will consider the doctrine that had developed prior
to 9/11 and the motivations and aspirations behind it. It will
focus on what appears to be the most important component of
federalism doctrine in this context, the "anti-commandeering"
doctrine announced in Printz v. United States,' which, based on
inferences from the Constitution's federalist structure, barred
Congress from imposing duties on state and local government
officials. The majority of the Court took this position despite a
warning by Justice Stevens that the Court ought to worry

Concern About the FederalCourts, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci., March 2001, at
132, 142 (2001) (arguing that the Court "has not reverted to its pre-1937 activism but
merely alerted Congress to think more carefully about whether federal solutions and
federal court access are really needed or whether to rely on state and local laws and
state court adjudication"); Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme
Court's New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 268 (2000) (characterizing current
federalism doctrine as "a creditable and moderate" balance between dividing powers
and benefiting individuals); Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searchingfor a Way
to Enforce Federalism,31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 689 (2000) (noting that the Court's recent
federalism cases have only "sought to limit the way Congress can do things, not to
place areas of regulation wholly off-limits to Congress," and ought to be considered
"reasonably moderate and responsive to the needs of the competing institutions: the
states, the Congress, and the courts").
3 Local law enforcement might be reasonably well suited to deal with some
isolated activities that are labeled terrorism, such as an individual bomber operating in
one location. Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2001) (narrowing the
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 844(i), which authorizes federal prosecution of the use "of
fire or an explosive" to destroy a building).
4 See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137
(2002) (describing the huge disproportion in personnel, with most police nationwide
employed at the local level).
5 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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about the way its new doctrine would work "in times of
national emergency":
Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the
administration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of children
to forestall an epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an international
terrorist, may require a national response before federal personnel
can be made available to respond. If the Constitution empowers
Congress and the President to make an appropriate response, is
there anything in the Tenth Amendment, "in historical
understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, [or]
in the jurisprudence of this Court," that forbids the enlistment of
state officers to make that response effective?

Justice Stevens was prescient. It is easy now to envision
emergencies that would cry out for the full cooperation of the
vast numbers of police, health workers, and other personnel of
state and local government. Did the Court really mean to
preserve the niceties of federalism in the face of events of this
kind? Could local officials form their own views about the
importance of, for example, smallpox inoculations after a
bioterrorism attack and accordingly decline to help?
A growing number of municipalities, as well as a few
states, have passed resolutions directing their officials to refuse
to participate in the anti-terrorism efforts of the federal
government.' These resolutions do not oppose the fight against
terrorism in general, but they take issue with some aspects of
powers
of
particularly
the
heightened
enforcement,
surveillance authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act.' These local
laws acknowledge federal supremacy in the form of the
Constitution, but express independence in articulating the
content and extent of constitutional rights and assert that the
current federal anti-terrorism efforts violate these rights so
defined. Thus, these laws create the potential for multiple
interpretations of the Constitution, a multiplicity that the
autonomy recognized in Printz could possibly shield from
review.
This Article considers the extent to which this
phenomenon reflects ideas about the normative value of
federalism, ideas that have been expressed from the time of the
6

Id. at 940.

7Id.

" See infra text accompanying notes 84-96.
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
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founding to the present-day Rehnquist Court. For example,
before the Bill of Rights was appended to the Constitution,
James Madison attempted to convince people that the
structure of federalism would protect them from the abuses of
power. He wrote in Federalist 51:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between
two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments

will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself."

Americans have become accustomed over the years to thinking
about constitutional rights as their protection from government
abuse and about the states as potential violators of rights that
require the supervision of federal courts enforcing federal
rights against them. Assertions about federalism, particularly
coming from the Rehnquist Court, which many perceive as
lacking sufficient interest in the enforcement of rights," have
struck many commentators as working only to shield the
abuses of state and local government." But what happens when
federal authorities begin to overreach? Those who disparage
federalism doctrine may think that constitutional rights offer
the best hope for controlling abuses of the federal government.
Yet that hope has its limits, because it depends on the
willingness of the federal courts to interpret and enforce
constitutional rights vigorously.13 Regarding matters of national
security, the judicial conception of rights tends to defer to the
14
expressed demands of the federal government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
1 See Simon Lazarus, He'll Look Better When He's Gone, WASH. POST, June 8,

10

2003, at B3 (reporting reputation of the Rehnquist Court as "hostile" to rights).
12 See, e.g., Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
13

The usual ability of state courts to enforce federal law, see U.S. CONST. art.

VI (Supremacy Clause), disappears when it is asserted against federal officials. See 28
U.S.C. § 1442 (2000) (providing for removal to federal court when federal officials sued
or prosecuted in state court). See also Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871)
(precluding state courts from issuing habeas relief for person's held in federal custody).
14 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 114-40.
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But does the autonomy of state and local government
recognized in Printz have any greater potential to protect
Americans from the abuse of their rights by the federal
government? At the least, the mechanisms of federalism work
differently from the use of federal courts to enforce federal
rights, and, as this Article will explain, in that difference there
is some potential for state and local government to work as "a
double security ... to the rights of the people." After describing
the Printz case, 5 this Article focuses first on the relationship
between the anti-commandeering doctrine and the protection of
individual rights." Next, the Article considers whether the war
on terrorism ought to lead to the creation of an "emergency"
exception to the anti-commandeering doctrine. 7 Finally, it
concludes that the anti-commandeering doctrine should be
preserved in its absolute form not only in spite of the war on
terrorism, but precisely because it can protect individual rights
that the exigencies of war may lead courts to narrowly
construe.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE AUTONOMY OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS: THE PRINTZ
ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE

A.

Introduction

In Printz v. United States, the Court held that it is
"fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
dual sovereignty" for the federal government to commandeer
state or local government officials to "administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program."" At issue was the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, 9 which required state and local law
enforcement officials to perform background checks on persons
who attempt to buy handguns. Rather than delaying until a
federal system could be put into effect, Congress opted to rely
" See infra Part II.
'6 See infra Part III.
" See infra Part IV.

521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
19 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter GCAI, amended by Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Brady Act]. This body of
law regulated the purchase of handguns in various ways, such as imposing age and
residency requirements and prohibiting sale to convicted felons, unlawful aliens, and
others.
18
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on the existing institutions of local government in order to
begin its regulatory program immediately. The Act demanded
that local "chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) receive
paperwork from gun sellers and make a "reasonable effort,"
within five days, to determine whether their customers fell into
any of the categories forbidden by federal law to purchase
guns.0
Let us consider the Court's basis for decision in some
detail.
B.

Textual and HistoricalAnalysis in Printz

Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the Court, did
not begin his analysis with the text of the Constitution, which
lacked a useful specific clause upon which to premise the anticommandeering doctrine. Calling attention to this deficiency,
Justice Stevens proclaimed in dissent:
There is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph in the entire text of the
Constitution of the United States that supports the proposition that
a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute
enacted by Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power
enumerated in Article I.

In the dissenters' view, the Commerce Clause authorized
Congress to regulate gun sales, and surely the Necessary and
Proper Clause encompassed the means of forcing state and
local government officials to administer the regulation."
20
21
22

Id. § 922(s)(2).
Printz,521 U.S. at 944 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The CLEOs covered by the Brady Act were local officials. Justice Stevens

questioned why local government should receive the protection of constitutional
federalism. Notably, local government is not accorded the protection of sovereign
immunity. Id. at 955 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This limitation gives rise to one of the
strongest arguments against the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine: If there is good
to be achieved by protecting the states from liability, why does the same principle not
extend to local government? As was illustrated by National League of Cities v. Usery,
the general protections of constitutional federalism do extend to local government. 426
U.S. 833, 855-56 n.20 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Leaving local government out of
sovereign immunity when the state can claim it creates real anomalies when federal
law and state law impose conflicting requirements on local government. Justice
Stevens offered this distinction as an alternate way to decide the case against Printz
and Mack. Printz, 521 U.S. at 955 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority did not
engage with this issue at all; it merely cited the case law that made the distinction. Id.
at 931 n.15. The majority also rejected the dissenters' argument that it was not the
state at all, but an individual acting for the state that was being compelled. Id. Though
this distinction is in fact permitted to carry a good deal of weight in the law of
sovereign immunity, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907), the Printz majority
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With no explicit text to support its doctrine and needing
to rely on the entire text of the Constitution and the Tenth
Amendment,' the majority set about looking through the
historical materials for inferences about the meaning of
constitutional federalism. Justice Scalia's opinion stressed the
early history of the use of congressional power, on the theory
that Congress's failure to use such a "highly attractive power"
in its earliest years implied a belief that the Constitution
forbade the assignment of compulsory tasks to state and local
government.24 Efforts to show that Congress had in fact used
this power failed to impress the Court. It discounted the
Extradition Act of 1793, which required the "executive
viewed it as irrelevant, noting that whether one commands the state or the state actor,
the point is to compel the state. Id. (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
23 The majority opinion criticizes the dissenters for "falsely presum[ing]
that
the Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of
federalism." Printz, 521 U.S. at 923 n.13. As in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, the
majority relied on the "system of dual sovereignty . . . reflected in numerous
constitutional provisions," including the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 924 n.13. Most
important is the idea of a limited set of legislative powers given to Congress in Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution, an idea which the Tenth Amendment restates in the
negative. Id. at 918-19. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor, does, however, explicitly
state, "The Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). This gave Justice Stevens the opportunity to lecture the majority:
[T]he Tenth Amendment imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated
powers.... The Amendment confirms the principle that the powers of the
Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively granted by the
Constitution, but it does not purport to limit the scope or the effectiveness of
the exercise of powers that are delegated to Congress.
Id. at 941-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's opinion, taken as a whole,
obviously recognizes these elementary concepts.
Id. at 905. More recent history also lacks instances of using state officials.
Id. at 916-18. To the extent that there seems to be any indication of such use, Justice
Scalia, noting the lack of explicit compulsion, speculated that the compliance had been
voluntary. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, rejected the interpretive move that
infers lack of power from unused power, because it would undermine the broad
interpretation of the commerce power that supports the vast areas of regulation
Congress has undertaken in the twentieth century, obviously far beyond anything it
had attempted to use in its first century. Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. id. at
936-37 (Thomas, J., concurring) (favoring much narrower interpretation of the
commerce power, which would not reach wholly intrastate sales, such as those
regulated by the Brady Act). Justice Breyer made the point that the lack of instances of
using this power may simply reflect the availability of other approaches for "assign [ing]
duties" to the states. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting conditional federal
...
spending, conditional preemption, and generally applicable regulation). Yet the
availability of adequate alternative means can imply that the severe means of
compulsion was not deemed necessary, as Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
indicates. Noting the alternatives available to Congress, she concurred with the
majority because direct compulsion of state and local government "utterly fail[s] to
adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional scheme." Id. at 936 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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authority" of a state to arrest fugitives at the request of other
state executives, 5 because that Act rested directly on the
Constitution's Extradition Clause. 6 Since there were no early
statutes compelling the state executive in the absence of such a
"particularized constitutional authorization,". the Extradition
Act, in the majority's view, contributed to the inference that
Congress received no implied power authorizing compulsion.
Accordingly, the majority noted, Congress requested state help
with the imprisonment of federal convicts: It offered
compensation and made alternate provisions when a state
refused, thus revealing its understanding that compulsion
would overreach its constitutional power. 8
There were a few early instances of Congress requiring
state courts to perform various tasks, but these did not count,
in the majority's view, because courts differ from the other
institutions of state and local government.u The Supremacy
Clause explicitly requires state courts to apply federal law, and
Article III implicitly requires the same by making the creation
of the lower federal courts optional."0 Moreover, quite aside
from these constitutional provisions, it is the ordinary role of
courts to enforce whatever law applies in the cases that fall
within their jurisdiction." Though established by a particular
sovereign, courts do not simply operate as arms of that
sovereign: They operate independently, ascertaining the law
and applying it pursuant to the orthodoxies of the judicial
method as they understand it. For them to apply the law of
another sovereign is not to be "commandeered" by any outside
25 Printz, 521 U.S. at 909 (citing Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch.
7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302).
26 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 2).

27

Id.

28 Id. at 909-10 (citing Act of Sept. 23, 1789,
1 Stat. 96).
29 Id. at 907.

" Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-07. The Court also noted that the "requirement"
that state courts perform some tasks related to the naturalization process may only
have applied where states had authorized their courts to perform these tasks. Id.
(citing Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S.
509, 516-517 (1910), and United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519-520 (1883)). It also
refused to count "ancillary" administrative tasks assigned to courts along with judicial
functions, although the dissenters sought to characterize these tasks as "executive." Id.
at 908 n.2. Finally, it rejected the dissent's attempt to characterize some state judicial
functions as similar to modern day adjudications that administrative agencies are
permitted to carry out. Id. at 909-10. As Justice Scalia put it: "It is foolish . . . to
mistake the copy for the original, and to believe that 18th-century courts were
imitating agencies, rather than 20th-century agencies imitating courts." Id. at 908 n.2.
31 Id. at 907. The Court also notes that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, requires state courts to recognize obligations created by the law of
other states. Id.
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power, but to follow the requirements of the rule of law itself,
and, in doing so, to exercise their own power. Federal courts as
well as state courts maintain this conception of their own role,
which betrays no element of subordination except to the rule of
law and to other courts with jurisdiction to review them." They
recognize that they are compelled to follow interpretations of
law announced by courts with final authority over a particular
legal text, but that is merely an aspect of adhering to law
according to the orthodoxies of the judicial method. 3
The majority strained to respond to several statements
made in The Federalist Papers that seemed to concede that the
federal government would rely on state and local government
officials, statements made to quell the outcry of ratification
opponents who worried that the new Constitution would

" The Stevens dissent did not see judges this way. It saw the requirement
that state judges apply federal law as an obligation imposed on them "against their
will." Id. at 969-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This view of judges provided leverage for
arguing that if judges could be compelled, surely executive officials could be compelled.
By the same token, it read the explicit reference to state judges in the Supremacy
Clause as a sign of special respect toward state judges; failure to mention state
executive branch officials, then, signified the lesser respect for their independence,
rather than a belief that they could not be used to enforce federal law. Id. at 970 n.33
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
33 The dissenters' key point here was that the tasks assigned to the judges
were "substantially executive." Id. at 952 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, an 'executive"
function had been assigned to the states. The majority responded by characterizing the
task as adjudicatory, a categorization that is consistent with the presumption, relied on
in separation of powers cases, that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively
exercising the [functionally identifiable] power the Constitution has delegated to it."
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-52 (1983) (presuming Congress was exercising
legislative power before finding a violation of the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses). Interestingly, it was Justice Stevens who took this presumption the most
seriously in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 749 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring),
applying the Chadha presumption to characterize the function of the Comptroller
General as legislative before finding a violation of the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses and disagreeing with the majority, which viewed him as unconstitutionally
exercising the executive power. If the state judges were in fact required to perform an
executive function, the imposition on state autonomy should be considered even more
offensive than if the executive branch were required to perform an executive task,
because not only would they be forced to perform tasks assigned by the federal
government, they would be required to perform tasks inconsistent with the judicial
function. The United States Supreme Court strongly protects the federal courts from
being forced to perform nonjudicial work, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211 (1995), and frequently expresses respect for the integrity of the state courts as
courts, as opposed to agents of the political power of the states. See, e.g., Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (equating state and federal courts with respect to
congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(presuming the adequacy of state courts to field questions of federal constitutional law
that arise in criminal cases).
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unleash an oppressive, overweening federal government.
While the dissenting Justices read these statements as
assuming that Congress would have the power to compel local
officials, the Printz majority saw them in a different light:
Congress would ask for assistance from local officials, who
would be inclined to participate willingly, because they would
prefer to avoid the intrusion of federal officials. 5 Of particular
importance was a passage from Alexander Hamilton's
Federalist 27 that referred to the power of the federal
government to "call to its assistance and support the resources
of the whole Union" to execute its laws which will become the
supreme law, which all state officials will have taken an oath
to support: "Thus, the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of
the respective members will be incorporated into the operations
of the national government as far as its just and constitutional
authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws."'6
This passage did not, in the majority's view, suggest
that the federal government could force state and local
government officials to carry out the work of the federal
government; it merely meant that the institutions of state
government, as they carried out their own affairs, would be
subject to the preemptive force of properly enacted federal
law. 7 In context, the passage addressed the way the new
For a detailed comparison of the policies underlying the anticommandeering doctrine and the problem of an abusive federal government, see infra
text accompanying notes 42-57.
35 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 910-11 (citing FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742,
796 n.35 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In fact, as
Justice Scalia's opinion indicates, the state and federal governments voluntarily aided
each other in the early history of acting under the new Constitution. Id. at 910. One
might well wonder why, if consent was seen as so easy to elicit, anyone would have
cared whether Congress could compel state and local government to carry out its will,
but one could find an answer in The FederalistNo. 51: It was important for local
institutions to have the vigor and autonomy to resist federal power when it crosses the
line into abuse.
36 THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original),
quoted in Printz, 521 U.S. at 911.
" Printz, 521 U.S. at 913. The majority rejected the idea that this passage
meant that Congress could make local officials the "auxiliary" of the federal
government, the interpretation that formed "the very foundation" of Justice Souter's
dissenting position. Id. at 911. As Justice Scalia explained, if this passage were
interpreted that way, then the states would have to carry out federal policy even if
Congress did not demand their assistance and, moreover, Congress would be able to
impose duties on state legislatures, a position New York v. United States had already
rejected. Id. at 912 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)). Justice
Souter attempted to avoid the latter problem by adverting to "the essence of legislative
power... a discretion not subject to command," but Justice Scalia called this a "novel

2004]

VIGOR OFANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE

1241

Constitution, unlike the Articles of Confederation, acted upon
individuals rather than the states.38 The point, according to the
Printz majority, was that the states would now operate
separately from the national government, which would no
longer be put in a position of "using force" to compel them to
carry out the federal will.39 This interpretation, according to the
majority, brought Federalist 27 into harmony with Federalist
36, which provided that the national government ought to "to
employ the state officers as much as possible, and to attach
them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments."0
C.

Normative Federalism in Printz

Printz did not rely merely on historical interpretation;
its federalism had normative appeal in its present-day
applications. "This separation of the two spheres is one of the
Constitution's structural protections of liberty," Justice Scalia
wrote.41 He repeated language from Justice O'Connor's opinion
principle of political science" that was quite simply "untrue." Id. at 912 n.5. A command
to legislate about a particular matter would not amount to a betrayal of their "essence,"
as the majority would have it. Id. The betrayal is not to legislative essence but to
sovereignty, according to Justice Scalia. Id.
38 See
id. at 919 ("The Framers' experience under the Articles of
Confederation had persuaded them that using the States as the instruments of federal
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict."). The move
away from the Articles of Confederation was quite specifically a division of sovereignty,
with some powers given to the national government, which could then operate directly
on individuals. Id. at 919-20 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 9 (M. Farrand ed., 1911)). Working through the states had failed, and the new plan
was dual sovereignty. Id. at 920-21 (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), and THE FEDERALIST
No. 39 (James Madison)). The dissenters' position was, as it had been in the earlier
New York v. United States, that the power of the old plan was preserved, not rejected,
and new power was simply an addition, in recognition of the inadequacy of the power
under the Articles. Id. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Framers did
not perceive the approach used under the Articles as "demean[ing]" to state sovereignty
but as "cumbersome and inefficient"). The majority soundly rejects this position, citing
Madison once again: "[A] sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments,
a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a
solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil
polity..." Id. at 921-22 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 20 (James Madison & Alexander
Hamilton)).
39 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton)).
40 Id.
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton)).
41 Id. at 921. Justice Scalia's Printz opinion also concerned itself with the
separation of powers: Putting responsibility in the hands of "thousands of CLEOs" all
over the country ran counter to the President's duty, under Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. at 922. Justice
Stevens dismissed the notion that the President needed to be able to control the agents
of federal power as "hyperbole." Id. at 959-60. Although the anti-commandeering
doctrine in some ways limits what the federal government can do, preserving state and
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in Gregory v. Ashcroft: "Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front."42 Justice Scalia also
quoted the language from Federalist 51, characterizing
federalism as "a double security . . . to the rights of the
people."43 He concluded with an important warning: "The power
of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably
if it were able to impress into its service - and at no cost to
itself- the police officers of the 50 States.""
The Printz dissenters
argued that the anticommandeering doctrine perversely encourages the federal
government to "aggrandize itself."' If Congress - and,
presumably, the President - cannot employ state and local
government to do their work, they will need to enlarge the
local government autonomy also enhances federal power to the extent that it
consolidates the President's control over the execution of federal law. This
enhancement of federal power, it should be noted, operates as something of a safeguard
against abuse, because it focuses responsibility on the President and because it
disables local officials who might themselves engage in abuses. If this safeguard were
genuinely important, however, it should be considered a problem to permit consensual
participation by state officials. See id. at 922-23 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70
(Alexander Hamilton), 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 495 (M. Jensen ed., 1976), and Calabresi & Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994)).
42 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991), quoted in Printz, 521 U.S. at
921). Ironically, John Ashcroft, now the figurehead of federal power imposed on the
state in his role as Attorney General, was at the time of Gregory v. Ashcroft, a state
governor who sought to resist the impositions of federal law, as the state of Missouri
procured from the United States Supreme Court a validation of its power to force its
judges to retire at age 70. Notably, Gregory v. Ashcroft is not itself a strong affirmation
of state constitutional power; it merely presumes against preemption in applying the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. But the theoretical underpinnings for the
stronger federalism cases to come were found in that case, which is quoted by Justice
O'Connor in her majority opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181
(1992), and in her concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Interestingly, the motivation to produce a normative
version of federalism came from a dissenting opinion in a habeas case, Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), which criticized the
majority's empty federalism. This sequence of events is detailed in Ann Althouse,
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism:A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE
L.J. 979 (1993).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 922 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
Id. Though it was Justice Stevens who wanted to rely
on an argument for
federal power in the case of an emergency, see supra text accompanying notes 5-8, he
denounced Justice Scalia's scenario as an 'alarmist hypothetical" that had no
grounding in reality. Id. at 959 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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federal government, which would only diminish the importance
of state and local government." Under this argument, it is selfdefeating to attempt to improve the lot of state and local
government by enhancing their autonomy, because it will only
lead the national government to compensate by increasing its
own power. Traces of this modern-day dispute appeared in the
historical ratification debate, which both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Printz tapped. Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion drew attention to the worries raised by
opponents of ratification that "overbearing" federal officials particularly tax collectors - would descend on the people of the
states.47 When they fretted that a "swarm of revenue and excise
officers [would] prey upon the honest and industrious part of
the community, eat up their substance, and riot on the spoils of
the country,"' proponents of the new Constitution responded
with assurances that Congress would use state officials to
perform its work. If the proponents were capable of thinking
that the use of local officials was reassuring, that the use of
state authorities protected from abuse by the federal
government, then, according to Justice Stevens, they must also
have believed that the new Constitution was giving the federal
government the power to force local officials to perform these
tasks. If they had retained a power to resist commandeering,
he assumed, the reassurance would not have worked so well;
the opponents ought to have raised the possibility of refusal as
a way to characterize the reassurance as inadequate. The
majority's answer here was simply that participants in the
debate were assuming that local officials would cooperate: They
took it for granted that the fear of federal officials would
provide the motivation to perform the work voluntarily.
Justice Breyer's dissenting discussion of the problem of
aggrandizing the federal government departed from the
original intent analysis about which Justices Scalia and
Stevens disagreed. Analyzing federalism in terms of its
normative value, he acknowledged that state autonomy can be
a positive, because of its potential to provide a "double
See infra text accompanying notes 42-57.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The FederalistNo. 27 is
to the criticism that the Constitution "cannot operate without the
addressed
entirely
aid of a military force to execute its laws." THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Hamilton).
48 Printz, 521 U.S. at 910 (quoting 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 502 (B.
Bailyn ed., 1993).
49 See id. at 910 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Hamilton)).
46

41
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security," as Madison termed it, for the rights of the
individual.' He then professed puzzlement over how "the
creation of a new federal gun-law bureaucracy, or the
expansion of an existing federal bureaucracy - [could] better
promote either state sovereignty or individual liberty[ .]" He
wrote in a similar vein in his dissenting opinion in College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
2 a
Expense Board,"
case that dealt with the scope of a state's
sovereign immunity defense. In that case, Justice Breyer wrote
that the ratification debate cannot be conclusive, because
federalism has obviously adapted at key points in American
history:
Thomas Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana, for example, reshaped the
great debate about the need for a broad, rather than a literal,
interpretation of federal powers; the Civil War effectively ended the
claim of a State's right to "nullify" a federal law; the Second New
Deal, and its ultimate judicial ratification, showed that federal and
state legislative authority were not mutually exclusive; this Court's
"civil rights" decisions clarified the protection against state
infringement that the Fourteenth Amendment offers to basic human
liberty. In each instance the content of specific federalist doctrines
had to change to reflect the Nation's changing needs (territorial
expansion, the end of slavery, the Great Depression, and
desegregation).53

Justice Breyer found no similar justification for reshaping
federalism in the period since desegregation, when federal
power against the states was increased in order to protect the
rights of individuals. Indeed, all of the reframing of federalism
doctrine up to that point came about in service of the interest
in liberty. Justice Breyer's idea of connecting federalism to
liberty echoes the position taken by Madison in Federalist 51,
which the Rehnquist Court frequently cites in justifying its
enforcement of constitutional federalism.'
The libertyfederalism connection is repeatedly invoked by voices on both
50Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (likening the American constitutional
question to the federalism problems encountered in Europe, citing The Federalist
Papers as rejecting some, but not all, aspects of European solutions to federalism
problems).
"' Id. (citations omitted) (arguing that the European experience with
federalism is helpful in answering this question).
52 527 U.S. 666, 693 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.,
Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.).
' Id. at 702.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
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sides of the federalism debate, which goes to show that, like the
historical materials, it is a principle capable of varying
applications.
In Printz, Justice Breyer asserted that there is simply
no across-the-board liberty-enhancing effect in protecting state
and local governmental autonomy when Congress has seen fit
to use the states in service of ends that fall within its
constitutional powers. He noted that "[m]odern commerce and
the technology upon which it rests" necessitate regulation at
the national level, thus diminishing what will be done at the
local level and undermining, over time, the salutary
participatory democracy that occurs within the smaller,
decentralized institutions of local government." He criticized
federalism doctrines that constrained the ability of Congress to
use state and local government, because there were so many
matters about which it would be forced to regulate. The modern
economy needs "government large enough to secure trading
rules that permit industry to compete in the global market
place, to prevent pollution that crosses borders, and to assure
adequate protection of health and safety by discouraging a
regulatory 'race to the bottom."" Because it must regulate, if
Congress cannot commandeer state and local government
officials as it sees fit, it must create a huge, overweening
federal government.
Justice Breyer justified the evolution of federalism
doctrine in service of the interests of liberty while rejecting the
Court's post-Civil Rights Era development of federalism
doctrine. He wrote prior to this country's recognition, after
9/11, of the terrorist war declared against it. Surely, we have
entered a new period that will exert pressure on constitutional
doctrine. But, as we have seen, Justice Breyer cautioned
against developments in federalism doctrine that do not serve
the cause of individual liberty. The war on terrorism has
created conditions in which courts are likely to acknowledge
greater national power, permitting actions that would not only
change the role of state and local government but that also
threaten to reduce individual liberties. Thus, there is a new
occasion to reconsider federalism in light of history, and it is an
occasion that in fact does offer some potential, as discussed in
55 College Savings, 527 U.S. at 703-04 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 977
(Breyer, J., dissenting)).
56

Id.
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the next section, for reinforcing the protection of individual
liberties. But what of the problem of an oversized, pervasive
federal government? If Justice Breyer could be so concerned by
the way modern-day commerce might produce a dangerously
aggrandized national government, should there not be even
more concern about enlarging the national government to meet
the needs of the war on terrorism? Enlarging the federal
government for this purpose poses a new and more serious
threat to the rights and liberties of individuals.
D.

Printz and Precedent

Justice Scalia's Printz opinion discussed the path of
recent precedent that led to Printz, beginning with an effort in
the 1970s to deal with environmental protection, a matter of
national urgency, by commandeering state government
officials. The Environmental
Protection
Agency first
conscripted state officials to "prescribe auto emissions testing,
monitoring and retrofit programs, and to designate preferential
bus and carpool lanes."" When a number of circuit courts
questioned the constitutionality of this "novel" approach, and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in one of
the cases, the EPA backed away from its regulations. ' In the
next few years, the Court decided Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.5" and FERC v. Mississippi,'
which dealt with federal environmental laws that skirted close
to the commandeering problem. In those cases the Court drew
attention to the constitutional problem, but nevertheless found
ways to uphold the laws. In Hodel, it relied on the fact that the
states were given a choice either voluntarily to adopt federal
standards or to suffer preemption of their own laws if they did
not. In FERC, the Court read the federal law only to require
the states to consider federal standards (or again to suffer
preemption). While there was a command to "consider,"
something some members of the Court thought already crossed
the constitutional line, the majority thought asking the state to
consider standards did not go too far: Indeed, in Printz Justice
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
Id. (citing Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown
v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 838-42 (9th Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971,
994 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
59 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
57
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Scalia put the word "command" in scare quotes as he described
the requirement at issue in FERC." Finally, in New York v.
United States, the Court faced the situation in which Congress
had directly imposed a task on the state legislatures: the "take
title" provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, which required state legislatures to
provide for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste or forced
the state to take title to the waste - either way, a demand on
the states to act. 2
New York had made it plain that Congress could not
commandeer the state legislatures, yet it was also plain that
the state courts were compelled to apply federal law.' The
discussion of precedent in Printz thus centered on whether
executive officials were more like courts or more like
legislatures. Counsel for the United States characterized the
CLEOs as following orders and not making policy and therefore
more like judges who - as the orthodox view of judging would
have it - do what the law requires. By contrast, a legislature
must make policy: Indeed, the statute in New York v. United
States commanded the state legislature to make the politically
difficult decision about where to locate a facility for the
disposal of radioactive waste. The dysfunction inherent in this
form of federalism was obvious. Congress sought political credit
for solving the problem of disposing of radioactive waste
without taking responsibility for making the very decision
likely to outrage voters. Thus, New York v. United States
demonstrated that political accountability lay at the heart of
the majority's federalism.
The majority persevered with its accountability analysis
It was not simply a matter of whether doing
Printz.
in
background checks technically constituted policymaking as
opposed to the mere application of the law. Either
characterization made sense: The Brady Act provided for a
specific task to be performed by the CLEOs, but there was
61

Id.

at 765. See also Printz, 521 U.S. at 926. Justice O'Connor, sounding

themes that would later find their way into the majority's federalism opinions,
characterized the law as "conscript[ing] state utility commissions into the national
bureaucratic army," FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), "unavoidably undermin[ing] state sovereignty," id. at 785,
"blur[ring] the lines of political accountability and leav[ing] citizens feeling that their
representatives are no longer responsive to local needs," id. at 787, and denying
"[clitizens ... the lessons of self-government," id. at 790.
6' New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
63 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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some discretion involved in deciding what "efforts" were
"reasonable."' The crucial question, however, was how the
Brady Act changed the dynamics of federalism. As Justice
Scalia analyzed this question, the key was " [p]reservation of
the States as independent and autonomous political entities. "'
Counsel for the United States attempted to deflect the
accountability problem by contending that the mere "discrete,
ministerial tasks" called for by the Brady Act would not lead
anyone to assign responsibility to local government rather than
to Congress." The majority found two problems with this
argument: First, by using the resources of local government,
Congress avoided paying for the work; and second, the local
government official was stuck in the role of being the face of
enforcement, the one to blame for any denial or mistake in the
course of performing individual background checks. 7
E.

Printz and Pragmatism

In the end of his opinion, Justice Scalia made short
work of what he dismissed as "a cluster of arguments that can
be grouped under the heading: 'The Brady Act serves very
important purposes, is most efficiently administered by CLEOs
during the interim period, and places a minimal and only
temporary burden upon state officers.""' Of course, this is just
the sort of argument that will likely be offered in support of
relying on state and local government to help in an emergency
with the fight against terrorism, so it is helpful to pause and
note just how little regard the Printz Court had for arguments
of this kind.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 927-28. Justice Scalia mused that this approach to the
question was "interesting" and "reminiscent" of attempts to distinguish between the
executive power and the legislative power in old nondelegation cases like A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935), and Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 428-429 (1935). Id. at 927. He rejected this formal
style of line drawing as imprecise and ineffective. Id. at 928.
Id. (citing Texas v. White, 7 Wall. at 725). Justice Scalia noted that
depriving the states of policymaking authority by writing statutes that constrained
discretion only exacerbates this problem. Id.
Id. at 929.
67 Id.
at 929-30. The idea of preserving accountability did not impress the
dissenters, who noted the tendency of local officials to make a public show of blaming
the federal government. Id. at 957 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Sheriffs
Printz and Mack publicized their opposition to the Brady Act).
68 Id. at 931-32.
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The formal, structural principle mattered, according to
the Printz Court, and would be enforced despite compelling,
counterbalancing exigencies.69 Justice Scalia wrote:
Where... it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning
of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural
framework of dual sovereignty, such a "balancing" analysis is
inappropriate. It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty
that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the
various interests can overcome that fundamental defect. 0

As the Court had recognized in New York v. United States,
constitutional federalism is worth enforcing even though it
seems "'formalistic' . . . to partisans of the measure at issue,"
who tend to see the value of a law recently adopted to serve a
"perceived necessity" of the time. 1 By "resist[ing] the
temptation" to approve of "an expedient solution to the crisis of
the day," the Court claimed to be serving the long-term interest
69 Importantly, he set to one side "laws of general applicability." Printz, 521
U.S. at 932. See also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding The Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA or Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2721-2725, which regulated
the disclosure and sale of information acquired by states in the process of licensing
drivers). Reno distinguished Printz and New York v. United States:

[Tihe DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to
regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of
data bases. It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any
laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals....
[South Carolina argues] that the DPPA is unconstitutional because it
regulates the States exclusively. The essence of South Carolina's argument is
that Congress may only regulate the States by means of "generally
applicable" laws, or laws that apply to individuals as well as States. But we
need not address the question whether general applicability is a
constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States, because the
DPPA is generally applicable. The DPPA regulates the universe of entities
that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and
private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce.
Id. at 151.
"' Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33. Here, Justice Scalia invoked the strict
separation of powers cases: Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (declining to
subject principle of separation of powers to a balancing test); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 944-46 (1983) (same); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239-240
(1995) (holding legislated invalidation of final judgments to be categorically
unconstitutional). Id. It seems a bit odd that formalism is appealing to the majority at
this point when elsewhere in the opinion it railed against formalism, for example, in
refusing to import the city/state distinction and the government/individual distinction
from sovereign immunity doctrine.
7
521 U.S at 933 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187
(1992)). By contrast, Justice Breyer, in dissent, criticized the "inflexibility" of the
which poses a surprising and technical obstacle to
majority's "absolute principle ....
the enactment of a law that Congress believed necessary to solve an important national
problem." Id. at 978 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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in avoiding the concentration of power," so that decentralized
government would still be in place to provide a "double
security" for the rights of the people.
In the post-9/11 period, clearly the federal government
has offered and is likely to continue to offer "expedient
solution[s] to the crisis of the day." The question now is
whether courts will continue to "resist the temptation" and see
the value of deterring the concentration of power in the federal
government. Similarly, one might wonder whether some of
those who criticized Printz for its hardnosed inflexibility in the
face of a gun-control policy they favored will see good use for it
in resisting what they may now perceive as overreaching
federal authority in the fight against terrorism. The tables
have now been turned with respect to policy preferences, which
will test the principles of both sides of the Court and the
commentators who aligned with them after Printz.
III. THE

RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

ANTI-COMMANDEERING

DOCTRINE AND PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

A.

Introduction

Let us consider the relationship between the anticommandeering doctrine announced in Printz and the
protection of individual rights. Madison, writing in Federalist
51, associated the structures of federalism with the protection
of individual liberty.73 Similarly, ideas about constitutional
rights lay in the background of the Printz litigation, as section
B of this Part discusses. To a large extent, ideas about
constitutional rights will provide the motivation for invoking
the anti-commandeering doctrine in the context of the war on
terrorism. Indeed, local resistance to participating in federal
anti-terrorism efforts has already resulted from beliefs that
these efforts infringe on constitutional rights, as section C of
this Part discusses. Section D discusses the limitations
inherent in relying on structural constitutional doctrine rather
than constitutional rights, but also finds important potential in
the anti-commandeering doctrine for preserving a robust
understanding of individual rights, perhaps beyond any version
of rights that any of the branches of the federal government,

72
73

Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187).
See supra text accompanying note 11.
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including the federal courts, would be willing to endorse
directly.
B.

The ConstitutionalRights Behind the Federalism
Argument in Printz

Printz analyzed constitutional federalism, the scope of
Congress's affirmative powers, and the force of the Tenth
Amendment, but the controversy also entailed concerns about
the right to bear arms.74 Only Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion offered a glimpse at this aspect of the case. Noting the
long lapse of time since the Court had addressed the scope of
the Second Amendment"6 and vivid recent scholarly attention to
the question of whether it describes a personal right," he saw a
"colorable argument" that the Brady Act violated not only
constitutional federalism but also the right to bear arms.
Looking more deeply into the litigation reveals its connection to
the defense of perceived Second Amendment rights. The
National Rifle Association (NRA) financed four of the cases
attacking the Brady Act, including the two consolidated in
Printz." The lawyer who handled the cases, Stephen P.
Halbrook, specialized in Second Amendment cases." The
74 The Printz majority did observe that statutes in the petitioners'
states

directed them not to interfere with gun rights. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 934 n.18 (citing
MONT. CODE § 45-8-351(1) (1995), ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3108(B) (1989), and declining
to decide whether the statutes prohibited the actions required by the Brady Act).
75 Id. at 937-38 & n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United
States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (limiting second amendment right to "ordinary military
equipment" that is capable of serving the purpose of "common defense")). Justice
Thomas would constrain commerce clause doctrine to the point where it would not
reach "wholly intrastate, point-of-sale transactions." Id. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (concurring opinion)).
76 Id. at 938 n.2 (citing many scholarly articles including the following,
which
was written by counsel for the petitioners: S. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED,
THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984)).
77 Sam Howe Verhovek, 5 Rural Sheriffs Are Taking the Brady Law to
Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at A10 (noting that four of five lawsuits were "financed by
the National Rifle Association").
7 See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY
MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); STEPHEN P.
HALBROOK, RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW
DESKBOOK: FEDERAL AND STATE CRIMINAL PRACTICE (1995); Testimony of Stephen P.
Halbrook, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitution,
Federalism and Property, Hearings on the Enforcement of the Second Amendment by
Congress - the Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 23,
1998 (arguing in favor of federal legislation extending the right to bear arms to actions
by the states, using Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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petitioners, Richard Mack79 and Jay Printz,n in fact were
concerned about gun rights as well as the burdens on their
workload. The decision to rely on the federalism ground did not
reflect a lack of interest in Second Amendment rights. As the
plaintiffs' lawyer Halbrook told the press: "From the point of
view of litigation strategy, the court understands Tenth
Amendment issues[.] They don't understand the Second
Amendment so much." 1
Thus, to some extent, the Printz case did involve
resistance to federal power based on a conception of individual
constitutional rights. Protecting federalism in Printz allowed a
broad conception of Second Amendment rights to survive
without contradiction." Local government officials could
continue to nurture their belief in an interpretation of gun
rights far more vigorous than anything the Court has ever
shown a willingness to embrace. Quite apart from the fact that
the Court has never said that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment,' and even if the Court
were willing to read the amendment as guaranteeing a
personal right to bear arms, it would still require an expansive
79 See Tom Diemer, Gun Law Records Check Worries
Local Officials; High
Court to Determine Whether Measure Complies with 10th Amendment, PLAIN DEALER,
April 21, 1996, at 25A.
Sheriff Mack's argument is simple: He is not an employee of the federal
government and should not have to work for it. He is not a member of the
National Rifle Association, but he did not hesitate to seek its help when he
found out from the ATF what he would be asked to do under the Brady law.
"This was never part of my job description," Mack said. "I disagree with gun
control. I disagree with federal intrusion. And this was both."
Id.
80 Morning Edition: Howard Berkes, Sheriffs Sue Government Over Brady
Bill (NPR radio broadcast, May 25, 1994) (describing Printz as "a card-carrying
member of the National Rifle Association," who "called the NRA when he heard how
much work he'd have to do to enforce the Brady law").
8' Diemer, supra note 79.

8' For the classic article arguing that the judiciary will "underenforce" some
aspects of the Constitution and that therefore other institutions should participate in
the articulation of "constitutional norms," see Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1224-26
(1978). For a recent article analyzing the Second Amendment in light of Sager's thesis
and arguing that the amendment has been made "a constitutional pariah, barred from
associating with other 'high caste' civil liberties our judges have labored to protect," see
Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an "Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorm," 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy' 719 (1998).
See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875). Printz and Mack would have had standing to challenge the Brady
Act on Second Amendment grounds, based on its limit on Congress: if Congress's
authority to require background checks violated the Second Amendment, the burden on
them to conduct the checks would be lifted.
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reading of that right to see it as barring the fairly reasonable
limitations imposed by the Brady Act. By litigating about
federalism, Printz, Mack, Halbrook, and the NRA did not have
to expose their robust vision of gun rights to judicial scrutiny.
Gun rights may very well have been the motivating force
behind their litigation effort, but they won precisely because
they relied on a constitutional theory that did not require the
Court to engage them in the debate about the meaning of
constitutional rights. If they had, it is likely that they would
have lost; and if so, they would have not only lost the case but
provoked an authoritative judicial opinion puncturing the
vision of expansive rights that they so treasured.
C.

Local ResolutionsAsserting ConstitutionalRights and
Refusing to Participatein Anti-Terrorism Efforts

The fight against terrorism has raised concerns that the
federal government has overreached its legitimate power.
Concerns about racial profiling, invasions of privacy,
unreasonable searches, and infringement on free speech have
fueled a political movement, led by groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Bill of Rights Defense
Committee, urging state and local government to adopt
resolutions directing their officials not to participate in at least
some aspects of the anti-terrorism effort.'
My own city of Madison, Wisconsin, is one of the many
cities that have adopted resolutions purporting to resist the
impositions of the federal government. The relevant portion of
its resolution, illustrative of the sort of resolutions adopted in
many places,' announces the city's policy to forbid the following
activities "in the absence of probable cause of criminal activity":
See Carol Rose, Ashcroft Bars the Doors to Democracy, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 16, 2003, at A19 (op-ed by executive director of the ACLU in Massachusetts,
criticizing USA PATRIOT Act for authorizing excessive surveillance of citizens and
political organizations and praising the resolutions passed in "more than 160 towns
and cities . . . in support of the Bill of Rights and against the unconstitutional
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act"); John W. Dean, Grassroots Opposition to RightsInfringing Antiterrorism Tactics, CNN.cOM,
Sept. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/09/15/findlaw.analysis.dean.patriot/index.html.
85 See Susan Schmidt, PATRIOT Act Misunderstood, Senators Say;
Complaints About Civil Liberties Go Beyond Legislation's Reach, Some Insist, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22, 2003, at A4 (noting "nearly 200 cities and three states have passed
resolutions contending that the PATRIOT Act ...tramples on civil liberties"). See also
Bill
of
Rights
Defense
Committee,
Local
Efforts,
at
http://www.bordc.org(OtherLocalEfforts.htm (last visited July 7, 2004).
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1. any initiation of, participation in, assistance or cooperation with
any inquiry, investigation, surveillance or detention; and
2. the recording, filing and sharing of any intelligence information
concerning any person or organization, even if authorized by federal
law enforcement, acting under new powers granted by the USA
PATRIOT Act or Executive Orders. This includes collection and
review of library lending and research records, as well as book and
video store sales and/or rental records; and
3. the retention of intelligence information. Information that is
currently held shall be thoroughly and carefully reviewed by the City
Attorney or other appropriate City official to be designated by the
Mayor, for its legality and appropriateness, using the United States
and Wisconsin Constitutions. Any information that was collected is
permanently disposed of if there is no probable cause of criminal
activity; and
4. enforcement of immigration matters, which are entirely the
responsibility of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. No city
service will be denied on the basis of citizenship; and
5. profiling based on race, ethnicity, citizenship, religion, or political
values.'

The Madison resolution, like others adopted around the
country, begins with an acknowledgment of the authority of the
United States Constitution and its superiority to all other law,
including subconstitutional federal law.87 It proclaims the city's
"long and proud tradition" of respecting constitutional rights,
its regard for its own "highly diverse population," and its
concern that the fight against terrorism "not be waged at the
expense of essential civil rights and liberties."'' The Madison
resolution refrains from declaring that the Act is
unconstitutional, but it does express concern that the USA

Madison Area Peace Coalition, Resolution to Dfend the Bill of Rights and
Civil Liberties, at http://madpeace.org/usapatriotl.html (last visited July 7, 2004). The
resolution also calls upon
any state or federal law enforcement agencies working within the City of
Madison [to] comply with the policies and procedures of the Madison Police
Department, and regularly report to the Mayor the extent and manner in
which they have acted under the USA PATRIOT Act or new Executive
Orders. This includes the names of any detainees held in the Madison area,
or any Madison residents detained elsewhere. The Mayor will then publicly
report to the Common Council.
Id.
86

87

Id.

88

Id.
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PATRIOT Act "threatens civil rights and liberties guaranteed
under the United States Constitution. "
A former assistant attorney general for the Office of
Legal Policy at the Justice Department, Viet Dinh, who drafted
much of the Act, ' has minimized these local resolutions as
"merely statements of principle of saying that the Constitution
... is sacred and that the states and locals will not do anything
1 According
in abridgement of the Constitution.""
to Dinh's
characterization, no one should violate the Constitution, but
since no courts have found that any provisions of the PATRIOT
Act violate constitutional rights, the resolutions mean little.2
Yet the resolutions implicitly take the position that some of the
activities authorized by the PATRIOT Act are unconstitutional.
Attorney General John Ashcroft summarizes the purpose of the
PATRIOT Act as "t[aking] down the wall between intelligence
and enforcement."" In distinct contrast, the state and local
government resolutions specifically limit their participation to
law enforcement, responding only to "probable cause of
criminal activity" instead of any lower standard, and withhold
participation in intelligence efforts altogether. The limitation
asserted in the resolution is scarcely a boilerplate
acknowledgment of constitutional rights: It is a robust
interpretation of the meaning of constitutional rights that
implicitly denounces the central purpose of the PATRIOT Act.
Confining participation in federal anti-terrorism efforts to this
extent is therefore true resistance to the federal program, not
merely a bland statement of a truism about the superiority of
the Constitution over other federal law. The resolutions
embody a policy of resisting the version of federal rights
propounded by the Bush administration, a policy that has the
potential to survive a United States Supreme Court
89

Id.

9o See Amy Goldstein, Fierce Fight Over Secrecy, Scope of Law; Amid Rights
Debate, Law Cloaks Data on Its Impact, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2003, at Al.

9' See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Deadly Attack; Too Tough (PBS television
broadcast, Aug. 19, 2003) (statement of Viet Dinh, noting that "not a single provision of
the USA PATRIOT Act has been overturned by a court" and that "the ACLU's
challenge . . . two weeks ago was the first time that any provision was actually
challenged").
92 Id. See also Goldstein, supra note 90 (quoting Viet D. Dinh as saying,
"Somewhere in this marketplace of ideas, of truths and half-truths, of fact and spin, we
get a ... picture of what the [Justice] Department should be doing....
The debate is
healthy to establish the rules of this continuing path toward safety.").
93

Mark Hollis, Ashcroft Defends PatriotAct; "OurStrategy Is Succeeding," He

Tells Floridians,SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Sept. 25, 2003, at 3A.
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interpretation of the meaning of those rights that agrees with
the administration.' Moreover, the resolutions may also invoke
state constitutions, which, although they do not bind federal
officials, do limit state officials." As long as no federal law
preempts the provisions of a state's constitution, state
constitutional law may offer far more expansive rights than
those found in the federal Constitution, rights interpreted by
state courts without supervision by the United States Supreme
Court.' By relying on the anti-commandeering doctrine, local
officials can, if they choose, find the power to uphold a far more
expansive view of individual rights than they could defend in
court directly.
As written, the resolutions depict state and local
government stepping up to the job of providing "a double
security.., to the rights of the people," the vision of Federalist
51. Surely, state and local government officials may lack the
nerve to persist in following the announced policy. It is one
94 The state might seek to "cut a broader swath" around rights, erring on the
side of protecting rights. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997)
(describing power of Congress to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to make prophylactic laws to protect the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion by "cutting a broader swath" than the rights themselves protect).
Section 5 doctrine recognizes the role of Congress in protecting individuals from states
that have demonstrated a tendency to violate constitutional rights. Similarly, the state
and local governments that are passing the resolutions described in the text represent
a belief that the federal government has demonstrated a tendency to violate individual
rights. Ordinarily, state and local government is in no position to control the
unconstitutional actions of the federal government. See, e.g., Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 397 (1871) (denying power of state court to give habeas corpus relief to a person
held in federal custody in violation of constitutional rights). The anti-commandeering
doctrine, however, quite interestingly gives state and local government some ability to
push back against assertions of federal power, as discussed in the text.
95 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 84-89 (discussing
Madison
resolution). Consider footnote 18 of the majority's opinion in Printz, which dealt with
the argument that state law barred the CLEOs from taking the very action that federal
law attempted to impose. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 934 n.18 (1997) (citing
MONT. CODE § 45-8-351(1) (1995) (barring any "county... or other local government
unit" from "prohibiting ... or regulating the purchase, sale or other transfer (including
delay in purchase, sale, or other transfer), ownership, [or] possession ... of any . . .
handgun"), and ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3108(B) (1989) ("[a] political subdivision of this
state shall not ... prohibit the ownership, purchase, sale or transfer of firearms")). The
Printz Court did not reach this question because the CLEOs who brought the case
themselves sought to resist the requirements of federal law.
96 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
81 (1980)
(recognizing independent power to articulate the meaning of rights in state
constitutional law). The United States Supreme Court recognizes state court authority
over the interpretation of state constitutional law, but it is unlikely to remain passive
when strong federal interests are at stake, as the litigation over the 2000 presidential
election made eminently clear. See Ann Althouse, The Authoritative Lawsaying Power
of the State Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial
Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litigation, 61 MD. L. REV. 508 (2002).
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thing to pass these resolutions in the atmosphere of a city
council meeting, amid idealistic expressions about rights - but
it is quite another to follow through when federal officials make
real requests and where resistance to these requests may allow
a terrorist attack to occur. 7 Yet, this structural safeguard for
rights can work independently of federal interpretation of
federal constitutional rights if the anti-commandeering
doctrine survives in its absolute form and if state and local
government officials have the courage to invoke it.
D.

The Value of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine as a Method
of ProtectingRights in Times of Terror

Litigation strategy prompted Printz and Mack to rely on
federalism doctrine instead of directly asserting constitutional
rights. Resistance to federal anti-terrorism efforts is also
taking a form that could be vindicated through reliance on
federalism. As discussed in the next Part, the war on terrorism
might move the courts to erode or abolish the anticommandeering doctrine, but for now let us assume the courts
will be willing to adhere to the anti-commandeering doctrine,
in its absolute form, so that state and local government
officials, if they have the nerve, will be able to decline to carry
out the anti-terrorism tasks Congress or the President
attempts to assign to them. What is lost and what is gained by
using federalism doctrine to resolve the controversy rather
than analyzing whether constitutional rights are violated?
First, it should be noted that constitutional rights do not
drop out of the picture simply because federalism doctrine is
used for litigation purposes. Constitutional rights continue to
motivate and justify decisions to invoke state and local
autonomy. Without the ability to frame their resistance in the
language of rights, state and local government officials might
not be able to win public support for their resistance, which
would otherwise resemble the federalism-based resistance to
the civil rights movement that still merges federalism and
hostility to rights in the public mind. Moreover, public demand
for resistance to the federal commandeering of state and local
government officials arises out of deep beliefs about the

9' One can predict that degree of emergency would affect the willingness to
resist. For a discussion contrasting dire emergency and chronic, low-level emergency,
see infra text accompanying notes 106-140.
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meaning and importance of rights and the special need for
vigilance in the face of strong claims about national security.
Ideas about constitutional rights are not the only basis
for state and local government officials to resist federal
demands. They also have political disagreements with the
federal government. They may question the need for those
efforts, care about maintaining good relations with an
immigrant community,98 or believe they have superior
techniques for dealing with security matters. They may want to
satisfy preferences of their own constituents, who may be
suspicious of or hostile to federal policy. Of course, political and
policy interests also underlie decisions to bring lawsuits even
when the claims asserted are claims of constitutional right.
There is never a necessary link between the claim one chooses
to rely on in court and the motivation for seeking a particular
outcome from that court. What is important here is that when
one chooses to base one's claim on a constitutional right, the
court deciding the case will need to say what the scope of the
claimed right is. Rights claimants expose their expansive,
idealistic visions to courts that might very well deflate them.
If Printz and Mack had presented a Second Amendment
right to the courts in attacking the Brady Act, their case would
have produced an interpretation of that right that might very
well have disappointed them. Indeed, that is exactly what their
lawyer expected and why he relied on the federalism ground. If
they had relied on the Second Amendment and succeeded, they
would have procured a decision about rights that not only
would have endorsed a vision of liberty that they treasured but
also would have obligated every government actor to respect
that right, including the many officials who were voluntarily
following the requirements of the Brady Act and who would not
invoke their power to refuse commandeering.' It would have
prevented the federal government as well from using its own
personnel to perform the background checks on gun buyers.
Printz and Mack won their case by relying on the federalism
98 See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, University of Michigan Won't Cooperate in Federal
Canvass, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at B6 (reporting complaints by "Arab-American
leaders, immigration lawyers and others . . . about the Justice Department's plan to
question around 5,000 men ages 18 to 33 who have arrived here since Jan. 1, 2000,
from countries suspected of links to terrorism," objections by "police departments in
Detroit; Oregon; Austin and Richardson, Tex.; San Francisco and San Jose, Calif.," and
refusal by the University of Michigan to help with the interviews).
The binding power of this interpretation of constitutional law would, of
course, depend on whether the United States Supreme Court chose to review the case.
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ground: the Court recognized their autonomy to opt out of the
gun control enforcement. If they had relied on the Second
Amendment they probably would have lost, however, and if
that had happened, there would be a decision in U.S. Reports
denying the existence of a right they believed they had. The
anti-commandeering doctrine thus deprived us of information
about the meaning of a right.
Would it be better to force litigants like Printz and
Mack to rely on claims of constitutional rights in order to
increase the likelihood that courts will produce opinions telling
us what our rights are? If there are rights, one may feel
tempted to argue, they should be proclaimed so that
government actors would know what they need to do and could
be sanctioned if they fail. °0 The main problem with this
attitude is that frequently the answer courts will give is that
the claimed right does not exist, thereby putting the judicial
stamp of approval on power that government was already
inclined to exercise. Leaving a pall of doubt over the claimed
right might have caused government actors to act with extra
precaution, cutting a broad swath around known rights,' °'
unless exigent circumstances push them to take actions
challenging the constitutional limit. Since a decision based on
rights will constrain Congress and all other state and local
government actors who may favor the measure in question,
courts feel pressure not to over-expand interpretations of
constitutional rights. Because of this restraint that limits the
judicial interpretation of rights, protecting the autonomy of
state and local government offers an important alternative,
preserving an expansive conception of rights in localities that
place a high value on the particular liberty in question.
This alternative highlights the way structures of
federalism can account for variation in conditions and
preferences from place to place."2 There are varying local
preferences about the balance between individual liberties and
actions government might take to increase the physical
'0o Announcing clear rules of constitutional law also creates a foundation for
overcoming the qualified immunity defense to a suit against a government actor for the
violation of constitutional rights. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
lo See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
102 For an extended discussion of
the values of federalism, see, for example,
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism:Evaluatingthe Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (reviewing
Raoul Berger's Federalism: The Founders'Design).
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security of its citizens. There is also variation in how much
local citizens desire to exercise a particular liberty and how
serious the threat to physical safety in their area is. The Printz
case clearly illustrated this kind of difference. It is well known
that persons in rural localities in the West tend to value their
own access to guns and are relatively less concerned with the
danger created when felons acquire guns than are citizens
living in urban areas in the Northeast. By avoiding a decision
based on the Second Amendment in Printz, the Court was able
to satisfy the widest array of preferences, as local CLEOs were
able to respond to what their own citizens wanted. Printz and
Mack could opt out, but the regulations and enforcement
structure of the Brady Act could survive in places where people
had different values.
Yet, if rights are important, should they not trump
these local preferences? A powerful lesson learned in the civil
rights era was that the local majoritarian preference might be
quite reprehensible. The law speaks in terms of rights precisely
to deny the preference of the majority, and there has long been
a particular worry about the parochial preferences of small,
localized majorities. 3 But what if the local majoritarian
preference is to increase individual liberty, if it is to take a very
expansive view of rights, beyond what courts would be willing
to carve in stone as constitutional law? The autonomy of local
governments can preserve a vigorous culture of rights, as the
resolutions described above indicate. It was at the local level, in
particular cities, with a specific set of citizens, where the
resistance to the PATRIOT Act gained a foothold. Is this not
the "double security . . . to the rights of the people" to which
Madison referred in Federalist 51?1"
Should we regret that the anti-commandeering doctrine
relieves pressure that might otherwise push state and local
government officials to challenge the constitutionality of
actions taken by the federal government?'5 By giving the state
10 (Madison) (noting that smaller democratic
103 THE FEDERALIST No.
constituencies find it easier to "concert and execute their plans of oppression").
104 See supra text accompanying note 11.
105 Consider how the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to disable the
state courts from having a role judging the constitutionality of the actions of federal
officials. See, e.g., Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397 (1871) (precluding state courts from
issuing habeas relief for person's held in federal custody). Similarly, Congress has
empowered federal officials sued in state court to remove such cases to federal court. 28
U.S.C. § 1442 (2000). The institutions of the federal government have made it their
business to supervise the constitutionality of the actions of those who do the work of
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and local government officials a less judgmental way to
disengage from a federal program, the Printz doctrine
discourages some vigorous debate about the meaning of
constitutional rights: Instead of fighting over the meaning of
constitutional rights, the different governmental institutions
can go about their own business, performing their separate
functions in their separate ways. Yet nothing prevents state
and local government from deciding when to invoke their
Printz-given right to be left alone based on their own ideas
about what rights are and when to assert rights directly. The
anti-commandeering doctrine thus functions to preserve an
idealistic view of rights, at a time when courts, motivated by
the strongly urged needs of the federal government to protect
security, would tend not to take the idealistic view of rights.
Moreover, the ability of state and local government to resist
being commandeered creates pressure on the federal
government not to go too far, not to put too low a value on
individual liberty, so that they can inspire voluntary
participation even in the places that have a strong tradition of
valuing individual rights.
IV. FEDERAL POWER IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY
A.

The Printz Court and Emergency

Will the anti-commandeering doctrine retain vigor in
the context of the war on terrorism? The Printz Court stated its
doctrine in absolute terms,"n warning of the importance of
"resist[ing] the temptation" to accept "an expedient solution to
the crisis of the day.""7 But the war against terrorism may give
rise to irresistible temptation, pushing judges to reframe or
explain away the doctrine. To what extent should emergency
affect the Printz anti-commandeering doctrine? 8 The Printz
majority, professing strict adherence to the concept of dual
sovereignty, brushed off an entire "cluster" of arguments for
state and local government. See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (rejecting
sovereign immunity defense for agents of the state); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) (creating
federal jurisdiction over claims for violations by state actors for violations of federal
constitutional rights). However, they have used their powers to prevent the states from
pushing back, supervising the federal government.
1'6But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), discussed supra note 69.
107Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933
(1997) (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992)).
108See supra text accompanying notes 3-9.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

1262

[Vol. 69:4

weighing the importance of the power against the burden on
state and local government.
Taking the opposite tack, Justice Stevens was not only
willing to balance federal and state interests; he was ready to
assign a heavy weight to federal interests and to minimize the
burdens imposed on the state. After warning of the important
needs that might arise in the case of an emergency such as a
terrorist attack, Justice Stevens proceeded to accept the
problem of gun violence as an emergency, citing 12,489
murders around the country over the course of one year."0
Although the number of deaths per year from gun
violence is considerable, exceeding the number of deaths from
the 9/11 attacks by more than a factor of four, the deaths result
from disconnected incidents of localized violence. Unlike the
international network of terrorism, disconnected criminal acts,
even if frequent and widespread, do not require a nationally
coordinated response. State and local government has
traditionally handled problems of violent crime, which are
susceptible to decentralized treatment. In fact, decentralized
treatment of crime problems can be superior, as it is tailored to
local conditions and preferences. Moreover, it can be more
protective of individual rights. For example, if Congress were to
attempt to federalize the crime of murder, in all likelihood, it
would make the death penalty available. That law would then
supersede the choices of many states that have embraced a
more robust vision of the right against cruel and unusual
punishment in their own law than the United States Supreme
Court has adopted as a matter of federal constitutional law."'
109 Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110

See Dean A. Strang, The Rhetoric of Death, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 841, 841

(noting that Wisconsin abolished the death penalty in 1853). States can recognize
rights that go beyond that provided by federal law if they are enforcing their own state
law crimes, and these state law rights have made a powerful contribution to the
development of federal law. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State
Constitutions:The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985);
William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977). State law rights, however, do not protect a person accused of
a federal crime. It should also be noted that the recent case law restricting the scope of
the Commerce Clause doctrine, because it limits the growth of federal crimes in areas
of traditional state regulation, has the capacity to preserve a more robust version of
constitutional rights that exists in some states. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995). Moreover, recent federal statutes have expanded the availability of the
death penalty at the federal level. "[T]he 145 unbroken years since [Wisconsin
abolished the death penalty] mark the longest time in American history, anywhere,
that justice has been administered without threat of death," Strang, supra, at 841, but
if a person commits a federal capital crime in Wisconsin, that long record will be
broken.
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In Printz, what was more important to Justice Stevens
than his own view that gun violence constituted an emergency
was that Congress had made a "policy judgment" that it
amounted to an emergency, and that it would therefore
supposedly usurp the legislative function for the Court to
substitute its own assessment."' Justice Stevens not only
wanted to use a balancing test to analyze whether state and
local government could claim autonomy as a matter of
constitutional law; he wanted to preclude the Court from
deciding the weight of the interests in the balance. At the
opposite extreme, the majority thought it was especially
important to resist the temptation to balance at all and seemed
to scoff at assertions of emergency. Justice Scalia observed that
every generation thinks whatever it cares about is a "crisis"
justifying an exception to constitutional structures, which it is
only too ready to characterize as empty formality. It is hard to
criticize the formality or inflexibility of the majority's dual
sovereignty analysis, however, if the alternative is a balance of
interests that the judge is forbidden to weigh. The supposed
balancing process becomes in essence complete judicial
restraint, leaving Congress as the judge of the scope of its own
power.
This resort to judicial restraint has characterized the
discussion of the broad range of federalism issues in the
opinions of Justice Stevens, along with those of Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer."2 These Justices consistently defer to
congressional decision making about the proper balance
between federal power on the one hand and state and local
power on the other. For them, judicial restraint completely
subsumes federalism, so that whatever efforts Congress thinks
ought to be undertaken as a matter of national policy become
ipso facto constitutional (as long as individual rights are not
violated). One ought to realize, then, that for these Justices, it
is not really the case that emergency justifies national power,
but that the congressional decision to act itself creates the
power.
III

Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens's dissent in Printz reaffirms the belief expressed in Garcia
that Congress is well situated to protect the interests of the states. Id. at 956-57
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He holds out the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48. (1995), as evidence of Congress fulfilling this role, even
though all that act does is permit members of Congress to point out that they are
imposing an unfunded mandate. See id. at 957-58.
12
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Arguably, this restraint should not extend to unilateral
actions taken by the President, the sort of actions likely to be
taken in the most extreme emergencies. If the reason for
deference is genuinely the belief, frequently endorsed by the
Printz dissenters,'13 that Congress is structured to take account
of the interests of state and local government, then decisions by
the President alone do not deserve the same deference. If the
real reason these Justices do not favor the enforcement of
federalism is, however, the low valuation of state interests
compared with federal interests, one might expect them to
favor deference to decisions of the President as well (at least
unless they see those decisions as detrimental to individual
liberty).
One doubts whether emergency mattered at all to the
dissenters, other than to critique the majority's absolute
position. Would they have argued for the narrow construction
of individual rights to ensure that government would be in a
position to deal with hypothetical emergencies? If not, it would
seem that the rejection of judicially enforceable federalism is
the motivating force behind their position. Congress is trusted
not because of anxiety about emergencies, but because state
and local government autonomy is not a significant enough
value to matter in the equation. What is missing from the
Printz case, then, is a serious confrontation with the problem of
emergency from the perspective of someone who thinks that
constitutional federalism is important and deserving of judicial
preservation.
B.

JudicialPassivity in the Case of Dire Emergency

In looking for a way to supply the analysis about
emergency that is missing in Printz, I found myself drawn to
Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Korematsu,"' perhaps
the most thoughtful meditation on the role of the judiciary in
times of emergency to be found in the Supreme Court's cases."'
113

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649-50 (2000) (Souter, J.,

dissenting) (citing the thesis detailed in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 805-06 (1999) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (same); Printz, 521 U.S. at 956-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
1,4 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
115 Justice Jackson also discussed the effect of emergency in his concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, which considered the implied
emergency powers of the President. Youngstown dealt with the struggle for power
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The Korematsu majority upheld a conviction for the violation of
a military order excluding persons of Japanese descent from
the west coast during World War II. Despite the recognition
that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect,"" the majority
took the position that "under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril . . . the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.""7 Extrapolating to
the anti-commandeering doctrine, one might speculate that it
will collapse in a truly dire situation that demands the
assistance of local authorities.
Consider, then, Justice Jackson's response. He admitted
that "[ilt would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to
expect or insist that each specific military command in an area
of probable operations will conform to conventional tests of
constitutionality" and that "[t]he very essence of the military
job is to marshal physical force, to remove every obstacle to its
effectiveness, [and] to give it every strategic advantage."
However, he also thought that courts should stand apart from
such operations rather than to distort the meaning of
constitutional law to uphold them."' He assumed that the
between the President and Congress, neither of whom necessarily needs to use courts
to fend off the other. In Youngstown, the Court imposed limits on the President despite
assertions of emergency. Jackson, in his concurring opinion, acknowledged that there
was a limit to how much the Court could preserve legal limits before the pressures of
the need for emergency power would overcome its will:
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the
hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A crisis
that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges
Congress. If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed
to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them." We may
say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress,
but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Jackson's acknowledgment is ominous for individuals and state and local
government in times of terror, because they lack coequal powers and must depend on
the Court's willingness to champion their cause.
'6Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
117Id. at 220.
'18 Id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Defense measures will not, and often should not, be held within the limits
that bind civil authority in peace. No court can require such a commander in
such circumstances to act as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably
cautious and exacting. Perhaps he should be. But a commander in
temporarily focusing the life of a community on defense is carrying out a
military program; he is not making law in the sense the courts know the
term. He issues orders, and they may have a certain authority as military
commands, although they may be very bad as constitutional law.
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period of emergency would end soon enough, and that it would
be better to preserve the law in a form untainted by
considerations of military exigency. The executive could
achieve its goals, but could not call upon the courts to aid it in
its extra-constitutional efforts.
Justice Jackson also wrote that courts were not capable
of framing doctrine that would account for the emergency,
because "[in the very nature of things, military decisions are
not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal.""'9 Here, Justice
Jackson expressed an idea about judicial incompetence
somewhat similar to Justice Stevens's, yet surely the two
positions differ. Jackson was writing about what the majority
had called "circumstances of direst emergency and peril."
Stevens simply accepted Congress's characterization of
unconnected murders widely dispersed over time and space as
an emergency. 2 ' The scope of judicial incapacity recognized by
Justice Stevens was thus far greater. 2'
The present-day conditions of the war on terrorism are
quite different from the emergency Justice Jackson needed to
reconcile with judicial power. This war could continue
indefinitely, with perhaps many years passing before there is
another visible attack 22 or with no further attack ever
occurring. ' Jackson could justify judicial inaction because he
could trust that the military emergency would end:
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer
than the military emergency . .
. But once a judicial opinion
rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle. 2 '

But let us assume for the sake of argument that at least
some aspects of the war on terrorism do constitute an
119 Id. at

245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying note 109.
121 Of course, we would not expect Justice
Stevens to defer to similar
assertions about emergency if individual rights, such as those asserted in Korematsu,
were at stake. But to observe this is only to restate the point made above that Justice
Stevens rejects the judicial enforcement of constitutional federalism. See supra text
accompanying notes 111-12.
122 The eight year period between the first World Trade
Center bombing in
1993 and the Sepetember 11th attack in 2001 illustrates the long time frame used by al
Qaeda. Moreover, the "area of probable operations" might be the entire country.
'23 See Hollis, supra note 93 (noting the claim by Attorney General that the
PATRIOT Act is working to prevent terrorist attacks).
124 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
120
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emergency comparable to the one Justice Jackson considered.
And again, let us accept that the anti-commandeering doctrine
is in place and deserves to be respected as a matter of
constitutional law.'2' Courts might attempt to follow the advice
of Justice Jackson and leave the absolute doctrine untouched
while still looking for a way to defer to the choices of the
national government out of deference to the exigencies of war.
Adopting this stance, courts would not opine about whether the
doctrine absolved state and local
anti-commandeering
government officials from the obligation to perform assigned
tasks, nor would they provide a forum for adjudicating any sort
of penalty that federal law might attempt to impose on them. '
The benefit of this approach, under Jackson's theory, is that it
avoids creating a new emergency principle of constitutional law
that would "then lieU about like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim
of an urgent need."'27 We do better to tolerate a mere "incident"
of unremedied constitutional violation than to find a way to
incorporate it into constitutional doctrine, in Jackson's view,
where it will have "a generative power of its own," affecting
everything that follows.' " To respond to the current emergency
by abolishing the anti-commandeering doctrine or reframing it
to include an exception for the "direst emergency and peril" to
make national power "commensurate with the threatened
danger '2 would be to take a position corresponding to that of
125 Four members of the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine in its entirety,

and many commentators agree. It may be that that the uses of the anticommandeering doctrine discussed in this Article will convince some Printz opponents
to rethink their position. But, obviously, one solution to the obstacles discussed in the
text would be simply to overrule Printz and abolish the doctrine altogether. My view is
that Printz raised a close question as a matter of original intent, but was justified on
pragmatic and normative grounds. The purpose of this Article is to examine those
grounds in light of the new circumstances of the war on terror.
126 See Dean, supra note 84, (speculating that local
officials refusing to
perform tasks imposed by federal law could be charged with obstruction of justice).
127 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245-46 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
128 Id.
129 One might recommend a more flexible doctrine, balancing
federal security
needs against the degree of intrusion on the autonomy of state and local government,
but the problems of judicial competence are most intense when confronted with
questions of military exigency. Justice Jackson recognized these problems:
I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me
wholly delusive. The military reasonableness of these orders can only be
determined by military superiors. If the people ever let command of the war
power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no
power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon those who command the
physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their

1268

[Vol. 69:4

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

the Korematsu majority. The Korematsu majority constrained
individual rights; the proposal to build an emergency exception
into the Printz doctrine constrains the autonomy of state and
local government.
Strikingly, Justice Jackson's solution in Korematsu
seems quite a bit like the refusal of state and local government
officials to contribute to the efforts of the federal government:
I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order
which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable
exercise of military authority. The courts can exercise only the
judicial power, can apply only law, and must abide by the
Constitution, or they cease to be civil courts and become instruments
of military policy.' 3

As we saw above, state courts were treated differently from
state legislatures and state executive officials in the anticommandeering cases, because courts are bound by the rule of
law, and state courts must enforce federal as well as state law,
because it is part of the applicable law that binds them. "1 By
the same token, federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
are bound to the rule of law, including constitutional law, with
its principle of supremacy over other federal law. Normally, we
would understand that to mean that judges must strike down
the unconstitutional acts of government in cases in which they
have jurisdiction. Under Jackson's Korematsu approach,
constitutional law, in the case of dire, military emergency,
simply becomes a justification for judicial passivity. The courts
themselves resist being commandeered into the enforcement of
military commands, on the theory that these commands fall
outside of the regime of law that binds courts.
C.

The Value of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in an
Emergency

Should courts today respond with Jacksonian passivity
to emergency measures taken in the war on terrorism?
Jackson's idea was palatable precisely because the peril of
World War II would end soon enough. Should a modern day
court, however, stand back and allow the federal government to
responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the
moral judgments of history.
Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
130 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 84-97.
131 See supra text accompanying note 64.
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transgress rules of constitutional law because of the war on
terrorism, which is potentially endless? Those who already
disapprove of the anti-commandeering doctrine, like the Printz
dissenters, might favor placing the doctrine on indefinite hold.
Yet, surely, they would not treat individual rights similarly,
the way Justice Jackson was willing to condone what he
thought was unconstitutional race discrimination.
Even if much of the war on terrorism does not rise to the
level of the "direst emergency and peril" faced by Justice
Jackson, some incidents in the future could. Consider, for
example, a serious bioterrorism attack, unleashing anthrax
simultaneously in numerous cities around the United States.'3 2
The national government would surely need to rely on the work
of the large numbers of local police and other government
personnel in place around the country; we can expect that it
would act immediately, commandeering local personnel to
carry out severe procedures to contain and eradicate the
disease. One response to this scenario is that the anticommandeering doctrine simply would not matter: Everyone
would comply. The situation itself would motivate public
officials to join together and accept direction from the authority
that is in a position to coordinate efforts. If we can predict this
response, we should not worry about what courts ought to do
about the anti-commandeering doctrine in the case of the
"direst emergency and peril." Indeed, the test of whether such a
condition exists is whether it inspires this unquestioning
compliance.
Yet it is not beyond comprehension that some local
officials would think that the threat of the disease in their
locality does not justify some extreme measures they are
commanded to enforce.'33 Some local government workers might
132

See Judith Miller, U.S. Has New Concerns About Anthrax Readiness, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, § 1, at 20 (noting "concerns about the nation's vulnerability to
terrorist attacks with" anthrax spores after fresh intelligence that an attack of this
kind is "a top Al Qaeda objective"). Miller describes "a secret cabinet-level 'tabletop'
exercise conducted last month that simulated the simultaneous release of anthrax in
different types of aerosols in several American cities." Id. This drill, called Scarlet
Cloud, "showed that antibiotics in some cities could not be distributed and
administered quickly enough and that a widespread attack could kill thousands." Id.
An earlier exercise, conducted by the Department of Homeland Security and
"involv[ing] 8,000 local, state, and federal officials," which "simulated a radiological
attack on Seattle and a pneumonic plague attack on Chicago," had "showed that the
government had enormous difficulties stopping the spread of contamination through
the country and into Canada." Id.
133 If they were taking steps of their own that interfered or conflicted
with the
work of the federal government, they could be subjected to regulation and preemption,
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think they know better about the risks of the disease weighed
against the dangers of the vaccine or might feel sympathetic to
local individuals with exaggerated fears about vaccinations.
Still, would anyone seek the courts' opinion about the validity
of commandeering? The federal government might simply
substitute military personnel wherever there were pockets of
noncompliance." The real prospect of the use of military
personnel would prompt many would-be resisters to go along.
Funding can also help secure voluntary compliance. The entire
problem of resistance could be averted in advance with plans
for emergency that include consent, for example, as a condition
on spending money to put various anti-terrorism safeguards in
place."
The circumstances would be very different from the
Korematsu problem that Justice Jackson confronted, where the
federal government imposed harsh restrictions on private
individuals who had every reason to feel deeply wronged,
entitled to disobey in secret, and convinced that their
disobedience would harm no one. Here, the federal government
would be trying to use local officials to perform services in an
emergency. These officials themselves would not be regarded as
the problem, but as a means for dealing with the problem. Most
of these officials as public servants would want to comply.
Those who did not, presumably only a few if the emergency is
genuinely dire, would be conspicuous dissidents from national
policy. They would be in a position to give voice to the
arguments against government policy, unlike, say, Korematsu,
who tried to avoid detection. In fact, they would need to explain
M

since they are still subject to generally framed laws that do not actually try to
commandeer them. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). At some point, actions of
this kind would be criminal. See Dean, supra note 84.
13 This is one test of whether there truly is an emergency, since this would
be
a very dramatic step, likely to produce harsh criticism, especially considering that the
military would be sent into a locality where local officials felt emboldened to resist the
emergency command. Surely, there will be a huge gap between the sort of emergency
where the President, with or without the backing of Congress, would be willing to
attempt to commandeer local officials and the more extreme situation where he would
actually utilize the military.
135 Efforts are being made to create advance plans for dealing with many of
the potential emergencies, including bioterrorism attacks. See National Press Club
Luncheon Address by Homeland Security Department Secretary Tom Ridge, Apr. 29,
2003, FED. NEWS SERVICE (noting commitment of federal government to fund state and
local government because of their crucial role in protecting against terrorism, with $1.6
billion provided as of March 2003 and plans for an additional $1.5 billion). One reason
for supporting the continuation of the anti-commandeering doctrine in its absolute
form is precisely because it creates an incentive for adequate funding and for advance
planning.
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themselves because they would be exposed to public criticism
for their failure to help. The pressure to comply with federal
orders would increase in proportion to the severity of the
emergency, but it would also decrease in proportion to the
strength of their argument that the federal government was
abusing its power and infringing on individual rights. At the
same time, however, the prospect of noncompliance would exert
pressure on federal policymakers to inspire compliance by
providing adequate funding and by proposing measures that
are not perceived as abusive.
Would the resisting local officials be charged with
crimes or subjected to sanctions?13 Perhaps only then would the
matter arrive in court,3 at which point there would be no need
to adopt the Jacksonian device to avoid penalizing them:
Adhering to the absolute anti-commandeering doctrine would
produce the same result. Clearly, respecting the antienforcing
doctrine
is
different
from
commandeering
constitutional rights. Jackson sought a way to avoid interfering
with the efforts of the national government and still allow
Korematsu to go free. But that dichotomy already exists in the
anti-commandeering doctrine: The national government is free
to take the steps it wants to take with its own personnel and
state and local government is able to refuse to contribute to
those efforts.
This resolution of the problem has an advantage to
those who are concerned with individual rights, which the
courts would probably slight if they were asked to enforce them
at the expense of strong national security considerations.
Imagine individuals attempting to procure injunctions from
courts so that they could avoid inoculations or quarantines
after a severe bioterrorist attack. They would surely fail. Yet
the sensitivity of some local officials to their concerns could
lead those officials to resist taking orders from the federal
government, and that potential for resistance might generate
136 Cf. Dean, supra note 84 (warning of the potential for charges of the

obstruction of justice if local officials fail to comply with the requirement that they aid
in federal investigation of crimes).
137 Conceivably, the state and local government officials would themselves
initiate litigation, as Printz and Mack did. They might seek a declaratory judgment
that they are entitled to refuse to participate. Like Printz and Mack, they would only
have standing to litigate in federal court if they faced sanctions for refusing to be
commandeered. If the federal government chose simply to bypass them, then, they
should not be entitled to extract an advisory opinion about the anti-commandeering
doctrine. The more dire the emergency, the less likely this kind of anticipatory
litigation is.
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more careful decision making at the federal level, taking
account of individual liberties to some extent. Officials
resisting commandeering would raise the objection that the
federal effort violated the constitutional rights of individuals,
the very rights that courts would avoid enforcing in
"circumstances of the direst emergency and peril." Indeed, if a
court ever did face the anti-commandeering question in these
circumstances, it would undoubtedly respond to the actual
context: The more intrusive on individual rights particular
measures are, the more appealing noncompliance would look.
By denying the means of commandeering to the federal
government, the courts have created an incentive to adopt
policies that inspire compliance, thus preserving a beneficial
structural safeguard for individual rights.
Preserving the Printz doctrine in its absolute form,
instead of trying to design an exception based on emergency,
also eliminates the problem of asking a court to identify what
constitutes a genuinely dire emergency. The willingness of
Justice Stevens in Printz to view murder as a national
emergency should serve as a warning against creating a
doctrinal exception. Even if courts endeavored to keep the
emergency exception under control, claims about the war on
terrorism will tend to look strong. Reexamine the list of
matters that the current local resolutions resist:' Which ones
could not be justified as part of the emergency of the war on
terrorism? More importantly, putting an absolute power to
resist in the hands of state and local government creates
pressure that works in favor of protecting individual rights.
There is good reason to think that opposition at the local
political level has moderated the behavior of the federal
government'3 and that this method of controlling the national
government is more effective than lawsuits based on individual

138
139

See supratext accompanying note 86.
See Philip Shenon, Panel on Terror Calls for Board On Protecting Civil

Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at A32 (reporting recommendation by federal
commission on terrorism "that the White House establish an independent bipartisan
panel to review whether new laws and regulations proposed by the government might
infringe on civil liberties"); Schmidt, supra note 85 (quoting speech by Attorney
General John Ashcroft asserting that the provision that would permit government
access to library and other records had never been used and characterizing criticism of
the PATRIOT Act as "castles in the air built on misrepresentation; supported by
unfounded fear; held aloft by hysteria").
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rights.' 4' This is precisely the vision of federalism found in
Federalist 51.
V.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of United States history, conditions
have changed, causing people to look more and more to the
national government for solutions to modern-day problems. It
would seem that the war on terrorism can only increase the
demand for the national government to extend its reach into
more and more aspects of American life. One might well
predict, then, that the war on terrorism will finish off the
Rehnquist Court's federalism revival: Federalism neurotics'.
will need to snap out of their nostalgia and face the hard
realities of a brutally changed world. What can survive of the
Madisonian "double security . . . to the rights of the people"?
How can the states play an important role in controlling abuse
by the federal government when we are forced to look to the
federal government to deal with such monumental threats?
It is well recognized, however, that the federal
government might go too far in prosecuting its war on
terrorism. It has not been my purpose here to express an
opinion on whether or not it has, but the local resolutions
discussed in this Article are part of the evidence that many
people believe or fear that the federal government has gone
very far wrong and has committed many serious violations of
constitutional rights. Not surprisingly, those who worry about
the violation of constitutional rights tend to assume that the
rights themselves offer the best hope for a cure. Remembering
how state and local government has in the past attempted to
use federalism arguments to deflect claims of constitutional
rights, they tend not to look to federalism for the protection of
rights.

140

See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, supra note 91 (statement of Laura

Murphy, director of the Washington National Office of the American Civil Liberties
Union).
[W~e just brought the first challenge to the PATRIOT Act two-and-a-half
weeks ago. The case has not been adjudicated ....
[Ilt takes a while for a
challenge to work its way through the judicial process. [One] cannot state
factually that the courts have reviewed all of the provisions of the PATRIOT
Act and upheld them. That has yet to be seen.

Id.
141

See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on A

NationalNeurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
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This Article has sketched out reasons for thinking that
federalism, in particular the autonomy protected by the anticommandeering doctrine, can protect constitutional rights
better than the direct assertion of claims based on those rights.
State and local government officials exert pressure on the
federal government that works differently from constitutional
rights. Claims of autonomy, justified by the Supreme Court's
decision in Printz, can arise out of strong interpretations of
constitutional rights. These interpretations may be drastically
overstated or naively idealistic and, consequently, quite
unlikely to move courts to rein in the federal government as it
pursues national security. But state and local government
autonomy can exert pressure on the federal government to
moderate its efforts and take care not to offend constitutional
rights, even rights that the courts would not now be willing to
enforce. To carry out its programs, the national government
will need to inspire the confidence of the vast numbers of police
and other personnel employed at the state and, especially, local
government level.
Because state and local government autonomy can work
as a safeguard for the rights of the people, the anticommandeering doctrine should remain in place, in full force,
unmodified by any sort of emergency exception. Courts, if they
are given the opportunity to rethink the anti-commandeering
doctrine should continue to "resist the temptation" to adopt "an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day."142 It is true that
this autonomy deprives the national government of a means to
carry out programs that may be vitally important. But in cases
of the "direst emergency and peril," the great majority of
persons employed at the state and local level of government
can be expected to respond without objection. Where there are
pockets of noncompliance, the federal government can send in
its own personnel, including the military. The different levels
of government will exert pressure on each other. State and
local government will tend to resist only when the emergency is
not dire and when the actions of the federal government offend
local beliefs, often idealistic beliefs about constitutional rights.
The federal government will want to win compliance and will
take steps to inspire cooperation, such as offering ample
funding and framing demands that take account of ideas about

142

See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
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individual rights. Remove the anti-commandeering doctrine, or
temper it with an emergency exception, and this beneficial
interaction is lost.

